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[QUOTE]Originally posted by Highway Hoss: [QB] A new article at [URL=http://www.sftt.org]SFTT[/URL] just went up about the Iraqi prison disaster...the report done on these abuses is, to say the least, chilling: [b]Abu Ghraib: Bigger than a Mere Scandal[/b] [i]By Ed Offley [/i] � You think those photographs of MPs abusing prisoners in Abu Ghraib prison are bad? They are, but the words are far worse. � The AR 15-6 report by Maj. Gen. Antonio M. Taguba on the activities of the 800th Military Police (MP) Brigade and a subordinate unit � the 320th Military Police Battalion, whose 372nd�MP Company was in charge of Iraqi detainees at the Baghdad prison � is a stern and harsh indictment of practically the entire U.S. Army and Central Command for its handling of Iraqi detainees. � Buried in the 53-page report, and obscured by the news media's fascination with the gruesome photographs of MPs assaulting and humiliating Iraqi males, are a number of findings that portray the U.S. military in Iraq and Army support commands back in the United States as clearly derelict in their duty to ensure that soldiers abide by the Uniform Code of Military Justice, the Geneva Conventions and the Law of Land Warfare. They include: � Ignored warnings of MP failures: � Taguba's investigation at the request of Lt. Gen. Ricardo S. Sanchez, the senior U.S. military commander in Iraq, began on Jan. 19 as a result of an Army Criminal Investigative Division (CID) probe into allegations of abuse at Abu Ghraib. However, there had been multiple indications over the previous eight months that the 800th MP Brigade was an ill-prepared, poorly trained unit led by incompetent officers. � On June 9, 2003, an 800th MP Brigade guard at another detainment facility known as Camp Cropper sparked a riot that overwhelmed his fellow soldiers and led guards to shoot (none fatally) five prisoners. Taguba revealed: � "Several detainees allegedly rioted after a detainee was subdued by MPs of the 115th MP Battalion after striking a guard in compound B of Camp Cropper.�A 15-6 investigation by 1LT Magowan (115th MP Battalion, Platoon Leader) concluded that a detainee had acted up and hit an MP.�After being subdued, one of the MPs took off his DCU top and flexed his muscles to the detainees, which further escalated the riot.�The MPs were overwhelmed and the guards fired lethal rounds to protect the life of the compound MPs, whereby five detainees were wounded.�Contributing factors were poor communications, no clear chain of command, facility-obstructed views of posted guards, the QRF did not have non-lethal equipment, and the SOP was inadequate and outdated." � The on-site AR 15-6 probe into that incident also noted an earlier clash at another detainment facility under the control of the 800th MP Brigade, involving an escape attempt five days earlier where an undisclosed number of Iraqis were shot by MPs. Taguba in his report noted that subsequently "four Soldiers from the 320th MP Battalion had been formally charged under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) with detainee abuse in May 2003 at the Theater Internment Facility (TIF) at Camp Bucca, Iraq." � Between June 4, 2003 and Jan. 19, 2004, there were 17 separate riots or inmate escape attempts at facilities under the control of the 800th MP Brigade. In reviewing the incident reports and interviewing MPs involved, Taguba concluded that poor training, breakdowns in guard procedures and inadequate physical security contributed to most of the violence. � If that weren't enough to set off alarm bells, the U.S. military had conducted two earlier reviews of the operation of detainment facilities months before Taguba was sent in to clean up the stables. � Taguba's report notes that before launching field interviews his team reviewed the "Assessment of DoD Counter-Terrorism Interrogation and Detention Operations in Iraq" that had been conducted by Maj. Gen. Geoffrey D. Miller, Commander, Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO).�This review by experts in "strategic interrogation" spent from Aug. 31 to Sept. 9, 2003 reviewing "current Iraqi Theater ability to rapidly exploit internees for actionable intelligence." � In addition, Taguba and his team reviewed a report, "Assessment of Detention and Corrections Operations in Iraq," that had been delivered by Maj. Gen. Donald J. Ryder, the Army's Provost Marshal General, on Nov. 6. � Despite those incidents and on-site inspections, Sanchez and the rest of his staff at Combined Joint Task Force Seven (CJTF-7) headquarters remained totally clueless about the 800th MP Brigade's shoddy performance until a soldier turned over photos of the abuse on Jan. 13. It appears unlikely that even Ryder's review finally woke up the generals in Baghdad, although Taguba noted, "Unfortunately, many of the systemic problems that surfaced during MG Ryder's Team's assessment are the very same issues that are the subject of this investigation.�In fact, many of the abuses suffered by detainees occurred during, or near to, the time of that assessment." � Lack of training: The entire U.S. Army military police branch is implicitly accused of dereliction in Taguba's assessment of the performance of the 800th MP Brigade. Taguba's conclusions are extremely blunt: � * "There is abundant evidence in the statements of numerous witnesses that soldiers throughout the 800th MP Brigade were not proficient in their basic MOS skills, particularly regarding internment/resettlement operations.�Moreover, there is no evidence that the command, although aware of these deficiencies, attempted to correct them in any systemic manner other than ad hoc training by individuals with civilian corrections experience." � * "I find that the 800th MP Brigade was not adequately trained for a mission that included operating a prison or penal institution at Abu Ghraib Prison Complex. As the Ryder Assessment found, I also concur that units of the 800th MP Brigade did not receive corrections-specific training during their mobilization period.�MP units did not receive pinpoint assignments prior to mobilization and during the post-mobilization training, and thus could not train for specific missions.�The training that was accomplished at the mobilization sites were developed and implemented at the company level with little or no direction or supervision at the Battalion and Brigade levels, and consisted primarily of common tasks and law enforcement training.� However, I found no evidence that the Command, although aware of this deficiency, ever requested specific corrections training from the Commandant of the Military Police School, the U.S. Army Confinement Facility at Mannheim, Germany, the Provost Marshal General of the Army, or the U.S. Army Disciplinary Barracks at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas." � Failed leadership: � Brig. Gen. Janis Karpinski, commander of the 800th MP Brigade, comes under a harsh spotlight in Taguba's investigation. Portrayed as a remote and distant commander who rarely visited the prison camps she ran throughout Iraq, Karpinski failed to monitor and supervise her subordinate officers, failed to issue standard operating procedures for MPs, and ignored a growing list of "accountability lapses" in her command. � Taguba is equally harsh on other officers already implicated in the scandal, calling 320th Military Police Battalion Commander Lt. Col. Jerry Phillabaum "an extremely ineffective commander" and describing two of Karpinski's brigade staff officers as "essentially dysfunctional." � After a four-hour interview with Karpinski, Taguba wrote, "What I found particularly disturbing in her testimony was her complete unwillingness to either understand or accept that many of the problems inherent in the 800th MP Brigade were caused or exacerbated by poor leadership and the refusal of her command to both establish and enforce basic standards and principles among its soldiers."� � Conflicting Missions: � What directly led to the abuse of Iraqi detainees were two conflicting missions at Abu Ghraib prison, Taguba found. The 320th Military Police Battalion was in charge of guarding the detainees, but the 205th Military Intelligence Brigade, under the command of Col. Pappas was in charge of interrogations. The heart of the scandal comes from allegations by soldiers that MI officials persuaded MP guards to "loosen up" Iraqi detainees by physical abuse prior to interrogations. � One MP said in a sworn statement, "In Wing 1A we were told that they had different rules and different SOP for treatment.�I never saw a set of rules or SOP for that section, just word of mouth. � Corporal Granier � stated that the Agents and MI soldiers would ask him to do things, but nothing was ever in writing he would complain (sic). Also the wing belongs to MI and it appeared MI personnel approved of the abuse." Taguba concluded that "[T]here was clear friction and lack of effective communication between the Commander, 205th MI Brigade, who controlled FOB Abu Ghraib (BCCF) after 19 November 2003, and the Commander, 800th MP Brigade, who controlled detainee operations inside the FOB.�There was no clear delineation of responsibility between commands, little coordination at the command level, and no integration of the two functions.�Coordination occurred at the lowest possible levels with little oversight by commanders." That's probably how the CIA managed to stash their infamous "ghost detainees" � prisoners whose whereabouts were unlogged and identities cloaked � inside a U.S. Army facility. None of this happened in a vacuum. Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld visited Abu Ghraib and met Karpinski in a highly-publicized event. There is a clear chain of command linking the lowest-ranking MPs to Lt. Gen. Sanchez and his subordinate generals. CENTCOM commanders in the fall of 2003 were anxious to roll up the former regime leaders still on the lam, including Saddam Hussein, and clearly pressed interrogation experts such as Maj. Gen. Geoffrey D. Miller to incorporate stronger techniques to get Iraqi detainees to talk. � A number of officers and senior enlisted men from the 800th MP Brigade have already been relieved of command and received letters of reprimand. Investigators are still looking into the activities of the 205th MI Brigade. Accountability will not stop there, nor should it. There should be courts-martial. � This appalling incident does more than undercut the progress of our mission in Iraq. For years, people familiar with the U.S. military have decried the gap between actual capabilities and the unceasing mission overstretch battering a force slashed by 40 percent after the end of the Cold War. For years, compliant military commanders have covered up the worsening situation with adjectives and adverbs. � What Tagabu's report shows us in unrelenting candor is that the critics were right: the U.S. military is in danger of coming apart at the seams. A scandal such as Abu Ghraib is merely how it plays out. � [i]Ed Offley is Editor of DefenseWatch. He can be reached at dweditor@yahoo.com. Please send Feedback responses to dwfeedback@yahoo.com. � 2004 Ed Offley.[/i] MY COMMENTS: The most frightening aspect of this report to me is how the chain of command seems to have unraveled here. Someone needs to demand serious accountability for this disaster (this whole business is WAY beyond a mere scandal). BTW I heard reports that those pictures published are just the tip of the iceberg; there are supposedly not only more photos but videos of abuses as well. Oh, for those who are interested, [URL=http://www.sftt.org]SFTT[/URL] has put [URL=http://sftt.org/article05052004a.html]the entire AR 15-6 report[/URL] online for your perusal. [/QB][/QUOTE]
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